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Abstract
Although theory suggests the relationship between crime and wealth is ambiguous, most
empirical analyses estimate a monotonic relationship and find that wealth has negative effect on
crime. Using two proxies for wealth (median income and poverty rate) and two types of crime
(property and violent), we find a quadratic relationship is the best fit for our four crime-wealth
groups. In general, the expected negative effect of wealth on crime only applies to wealthier
counties. In poorer counties, wealth has an unexpected positive effect on crime. This result may
be theoretically consistent, or an unintended byproduct of the Uniform Crime Reports data,
which do not include unreported crime.
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Introduction
Economists have long been interested in crime. Becker’s (1968) seminal study
and its immediate followers (Ehrlich, 1973; Sjoquist, 1973; Block and Heineke, 1975)
model the relationship between crime and a variety of covariates, including deterrence,
police expenditures, and wealth. Nearly all theoretical approaches model participation in
crime as a substitute for legitimate employment. For example, Ehrlich (1996) notes the
supply of crime is determined by the expected net return, which equals expected gross
return minus forgone wages at a legitimate job and expected punishment. In this setting,
it is tempting to assume that an increase in wealth should decrease crime because
foregone earnings are increasing. However, if the increase in wealth applies to the
individual and his surroundings, then the expected return of crime rises. In this case, the
relationship between crime and wealth is ambiguous. In fact, Block and Heineke (1975)
note the sign of this relationship is indeterminant in the general case and positive
assuming risk aversion and the psychic cost of crime is independent of wealth.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of empirical research estimates a monotonic function
(typically a linear model or log transformation) and finds a negative relationship between
wealth and crime.
The increase in data availability allowed many of these early theoretical
relationships to be tested, and the most common aggregate data set is the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). UCR data are attractive for many
reasons. They are available annually, at the county-level, and split crime into eight
categories. But UCR data can only count crimes that are reported. Not only does this
underestimate the amount of crime, Levitt (1998) notes reporting tendencies and how
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crimes are classified are not equal across areas. Victimization data alleviate some of these
problems, but the most common victimization data set (National Crime Victimization
Survey, public release) does not identify a geographical location smaller than four regions
of the United States. For this reason, UCR data will likely remain common in the crime
literature.
We find an unusual aspect of UCR data when investigating the relationship
between crime and wealth at the county level. Using median income and the poverty rate
as proxies for wealth, we find a quadratic relationship between wealth and crime fits best.
Specifically, the effect of wealth on crime is negative (the expected sign) for rich counties
but positive (the unexpected sign) for poor counties. We offer two explanations. First, this
result can be considered theoretically consistent. In this scenario, an increase in wealth
raises expected returns of crime faster than foregone wages for poor counties, and vice
versa for rich counties. Second, the quadratic effect may be the result of using only
reported crimes rather than all crimes. For example, an increase in wealth in a poorer
county may also raise reporting tendencies because of greater trust of law enforcement by
locals or higher police expenditures. Regardless of the cause, researchers should be aware
of this aspect of UCR data.
Literature and Methods
As mentioned in the introduction, Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973), Sjoquist (1973),
and Block and Heineke (1975) are widely considered to be the first economic analyses of
crime. These studies inspired a number of empirical approaches that test the relationship
of crime and a variety of covariates, such as unemployment (Cantor and Land, 1985;
Chiricos, 1987; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002),
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wages (Grogger, 1998; Levitt, 1999; Gould, et al., 2002), poverty (Lee, 2000), education
(Sjoquist, 1973; Lochner, 2004; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Buonanno and Leonida,
2009), inequality (Bourguignon, 2001; Kelly 2000; Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza,
2002), and deterrence (Ehrlich, 1981; Cornwell and Trumbull, 1994; Corman and Mocan,
2000; Liedka, Piehl, and Useem, 2006).
UCR data is the most common data set in empirical analyses of crime. Among the
empirical papers mentioned above, Cantor and Land (1985), Chiricos (1987), Levitt
(1998), Kelly (2000), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Gould, et al. (2002), Lochner
(2004), and Liedka, et al. (2006) use UCR data. In addition, Sjoquist (1973) and Lee
(2000) use data on reported crimes from the FBI. Although UCR data are available
annually at the county-level, its lack of unreported crimes bias the results if the amount of
unreported crime is correlated with unemployment, wealth, education, or any of the other
key covariates mentioned above.
The logic behind our estimations most closely follows the studies by Isaac Ehrlich
(1973, 1977, 1981, and 1996), although similar rationale can found elsewhere. In
Ehrlich’s 1996 study, he notes the demand for crime comprises the demand for stolen
goods and society’s tolerance of crime. In comparison, the supply of offenses is
determined by the expected net return which equals expected gross return minus forgone
wages and expected punishment. This implies a reduced-form model where crime is a
function of expected gross return, foregone wages, and punishment. Since UCR data are
aggregate at the county level, it is impossible to separate expected gross return and
foregone wages, which forces us to simplify the reduced-form model to crime as a
function of wealth and punishment. While this simplification is not ideal, it is common in
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the empirical literature. We also follow the empirical literature by including a variety of
demographic controls, such as racial/ethnic, gender, and age distribution to produce a
standard empirical model of crime.
Data
UCR data are available annually, at the county-level, and include eight types. We
create two broader categories from these eight types of crime. Violent crime is committed
with force, and consists of murder/manslaughter, rape, robbery, and assaults. Property
crime consists of burglaries, larceny, arson, and motor vehicle theft. The theory is a better
match for property crime, since these crimes are more likely to be done for financial gain
while the motivations for violent crime are less understood. Nevertheless, we present
results for both types. 1 We scaled both types of crime so that each is per 100,000 people
to control for differences in population. In addition, many small counties have potentially
unreliable data because of fewer reporting agencies, so we use counties with at least
50,000 residents.
All other controls come from the City and County Data Book (CCDB). We use
two proxies for wealth at the county-level: median income and poverty rate. Because of
limited CCDB data availability, the sample frame for estimations is 2000 to 2004
inclusive. Demographic data consists of racial/ethnicity composition (percent of black,
Hispanic, and Asian residents), gender, and age distribution. Because of their unique
racial and ethnic compositions, counties in Hawaii or Alaska were omitted. Table 1
presents some summary statistics after making these deletions. We also include fixed
effects for each county to capture any persistent differences across counties such as

1

Our results are similar using separate estimations for each type of crime, although some crimes, such as
murder, do not work as well because of considerably lower means.
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reporting tendencies. This is one of Levitt’s (1998) main concerns with UCR data, which
notes reporting tendencies and how crimes are classified are not equal across areas.
County-level fixed effects alleviate this concern assuming these problems are timeinvariant. Yearly dummy variables are included to account for national trends affecting
crime not captured by the other independent variables.
There are separate estimations for property and violent crime using the same
explanatory variables. Within each type of crime, there are separate estimations for each
proxy of wealth (median income and poverty rate) because of their high correlation. This
creates four estimations; one for each crime-wealth combination. Finally, Breusch-Pagan
(BP) tests indicate that all four crime-wealth estimations are hetroskedastic. However, the
form of hetroskedasticity is too difficult to model with feasible generalized least squares,
and the results include the White standard error corrections.
Property Crime Results
Table 2 presents some estimation results for five different model specifications of
the property crime-median income model. With the exception of the best fit model
presented at Table 4, all other estimates are suppressed for brevity but are available upon
request. In general, the specification choice has little impact on the other estimates.
Using the adjusted r-squared, the linear, linear-log, and quadratic models have
similar explanatory power. However, only the linear and quadratic models produce
statistically significant effects of median income. Since the difference between these two
models is the statistically significant second-order term, we believe the quadratic
provides the best fit for the relationship between property crime and median income.
Based on the estimates, the marginal effect of median income on property crime is
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∂ ( procrime)
= 0.0667 + 2(−8.08 *10 − 7 )medianinc
∂ (medianinc)
Setting the above equal to zero, the level of median income where the marginal effect on
crime changes from positive to negative is about $41,260. For counties with median
income above $41,260 (about 48% of the counties), the marginal effect of median income
is negative, which is the sign that is expected from past empirical work. However, the
effect of median income on crime is positive for the remaining 52% of the counties.
Figure 1 illustrates this relationship.
Table 3 presents model specifications for the property crime-poverty rate model.
These results are similar to Table 2. The adjusted r-squared again suggests the linear,
linear-log, and quadratic models have similar explanatory power. Although none of the
estimates are statistically significant, the quadratic has by far the lowest p-values. 2 For
this reason, we believe the quadratic produces the best fit of the relationship between
poverty and property crime.
Although the estimates are outside of what most consider statistically significant,
the estimated marginal effect of the poverty rate on property crime is

∂ ( procrime)
= 42.302 + 2(−1.656) poverty
∂ ( poverty)
Setting the above equal to zero, the level of poverty where the marginal effect changes
from positive to negative is about 12.75%. For counties with poverty below 12.75%
(about 63% of the counties), the marginal effect of poverty is positive, leaving
approximately 37% of counties with higher poverty rates with the opposite sign. Figure 2

2 It is not surprising the effect of poverty rates do not fit as well compared to the effect of median income.
Most theoretical models motivate the decision to commit crime using income, and the poverty rate is a
transformation of the income level.
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illustrates this relationship.
Although the percentage of counties with the unexpected effect of wealth is
different (52% and 37%), these results are compatible because the relationship between
median income and poverty is non-linear. Median income and poverty rates are highly
correlated, and the best fit regression of this relationship is linear-log. Below is the result
of this estimation, with standard errors in parentheses.
medianinc = − 22,867.91 ln( poverty ) + 97,195.01
(197.79 )

(1)

( 476.13 )

The r-squared of this regression is .7539. At the threshold of poverty rate 12.75% the
predicted median income is $38,984, which is close to the median income threshold
$41,260. Further, 37% of counties have median income less than $38,984, which is the
same percentage of counties below the poverty rate threshold.
Table 4 presents the estimates and standard errors from the quadratic fit of the
property crime-median income and property crime-poverty rate estimations. All estimates
are included except for the fixed effect controls for each county. Given controls for
wealth and dummy variables for each year and county, most of the remaining estimates
are statistically insignificant. The main exception is the percent of females in a county,
which has a positive and statistically significant effect on property crime.
In general, both of these models indicate the negative effect of wealth that is
common in the empirical literature does not apply to poorer counties. In fact, these
models predict that an increase in wealth in a poorer county should increase crime. While

this is not intuitive, it is consistent with the theoretical literature under a set of
assumptions. Using Ehlrich’s theoretical models, this unexpected effect of wealth
on crime can occur if an increase in wealth raises expected returns to crime faster than
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foregone wages in poorer counties. Alternatively, this result could also be a byproduct of
the UCR data which does not include unreported crimes.
Violent Crime Results
Although the theoretical models are better fit for property crimes than violent
crimes, several studies estimate the determinants of violent crime. For example, Kelly
(2000) studies the impact of police expenditures and inequality on violent crime and finds
“violent crime is little affected by police activity or poverty but strongly affected by
inequality, measured either by income or education.” Other papers note that some violent
crimes are committed for pecuniary gain. Fajnzylber and Lederman (2002) note that
“homicides are also committed for profit-seeking motives”, and find average income and
education attainment have significant and negative effects on violent crime. Although it is
difficult to model violent crime, there is established empirical connection between violent
crime and wealth.
Table 5 presents some estimation results for five different model specifications
of the violent crime-median income model. The linear, linear-log, and quadratic models
again provide the highest adjusted r-squared values, but the quadratic has by far the
lowest p-values.
Although the quadratic estimates are statistically insignificant, the estimated
marginal effect of median income on violent crime is
∂ (viocrime)
= 0.00553 + 2(−4.80 *10 −8 )medianinc
∂ (medianinc)
Setting the above equal to zero, the threshold of median income where the marginal effect
changes from positive to negative is about $57,556. In other words, counties with median
income below $57,556 (about 89% of the counties) have a positive marginal effect of
9

median income. Counties with median income above $57,556 (about 11% of the
counties), have a negative marginal effect of median income. Figure 3 illustrates this
relationship.
Table 6 presents the model specification tests for the violent crime-poverty rate
model. The results are very similar to the violent crime-median income specification tests
in Table 5, except the log-log and quadratic models provide statistically significant effects
of the poverty rate. Since the adjusted r-squared is higher in the quadratic model, we
consider the quadratic to be the best fit.
Based on the estimates, the marginal effect of poverty on violent crime is
∂ (viocrime)
= 15.267 + 2(−0.583) poverty
∂ ( poverty)
Setting the above equal to zero, the threshold of poverty level of poverty where the
marginal effect changes from positive to negative is about 13.09%. For counties with
poverty below 13.09% (about 70% of the counties), the marginal effect of poverty is
positive. This leaves approximately 30% of counties where higher poverty rates
correspond with less violent crime. Figure 4 illustrates this relationship.
Similar to the property crime models, the percent of counties with the unexpected
effect of wealth is different (89% and 30%) in the violent crime results. In order to test
whether these are compatible, we use the empirical relationship between median income
and poverty at equation (1). At the threshold of poverty rate 13.09%, the predicted
median income is $38,360, which is not close to the median income threshold $57,556.
This incompatibility is probably caused by the weaker theoretical relationship between
violent crime and wealth. Nevertheless, this does not change our main results that wealth
has a quadratic effect on violent crime.
10

Table 7 presents the estimates and standard errors from the quadratic fit of the
violent crime-median income and violent crime-poverty rate estimations. All estimates
are included except for the fixed effect controls for each county. As in the property crime
models, most of the estimates are statistically insignificant which is probably because
wealth, county-specific, and year-specific effects are included in the model. The
exceptions are the percent of females and Asians. Females have a positive and
statistically significant effect on violent crime, while Asians have a negative and
statistically significant effect.
Conclusion

Many social factors affect both property and violent crime. Although theoretical
models suggest an ambiguous effect of wealth on crime, the empirical literature usually
estimates a monotonic effect. After testing several specifications of the crime-wealth
relationship, we find that a quadratic model fits best. This quadratic result exists even in
the presence of controls for county-specific fixed effects, year dummies, and controls for
age, sex, and race/ethnicity distribution.
In general, wealth has a negative effect on crime for rich counties and a positive
effect on crime for poor counties. This means the negative relationship that is typically
found in the empirical literature only applies to wealthy counties. In poor counties, the
opposite occurs: an increase in wealth in these counties has a positive effect on crime. As
stated earlier, this result is consistent with Ehrlich’s theory only under a set of restrictive
assumptions. Namely an increase in wealth raises expected returns to crime faster than
foregone wages in poorer counties and vice versa in wealthy counties. It is difficult to
reconcile why this would occur. One possibility is that an increase in median wealth may
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be coupled with an increase in inequality. An extreme example is when income increases
for only the wealthiest in a county, making them more profitable targets while leaving
foregone wages for everyone else constant. The other explanation for this result is that
UCR data only include reported crime. This aspect of UCR data has been noted in the
literature, and our quadratic effect may be another unintended byproduct of omitting
unreported crimes. We hope that future research is dedicated to determining whether this
quadratic effect is a byproduct of theory (i.e., foregone wages changing at a different rate
than expected return) or using only reported crimes.
As the empirical explanations of crime continue to develop, it is likely that UCR
data will continue to be the main data set. Our main concern is that the quadratic effect of
crime will continue to be ignored which will produce misleading results. This is
particularly problematic for those that analyze the effect of crime reduction policies in
poorer areas, such as encouraging high school completion. It is likely that such a policy
would increase reported crime, which is the opposite of the intended effect.
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Table 1: UCR data summary
Variable

Violent Crime (per 100,000 people)
Property Crime (per 100,000 people)
Median Income
Poverty Rate
% White
% Black
% Asian
% Hispanic
% Female
% under 14 years old
% between 15 and 29 years old
% between 30 and 49 years old
% older than 50 years old

Mean
(Standard Deviation)
355.84
(374.43)
3,178.14
(1,560.68)
$42,913
($10,578)
11.61%
(4.50%)
85.01%
10.26%
2.14%
7.97%
50.78%
20.53%
21.10%
29.37%
27.40%

Note: All summary statistics are from 4,635 county-years between 2000 and 2004.
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Table 2: Property Crime & Median Income Model Comparison
Model

adjusted
r-squared

Variable

linear

0.9123

median income

log-linear

0.7955

median income

log-log

0.7954

ln(median income)

linear-log

0.9122

ln(median income)

quadratic

0.9125

median income
median income
squared

coefficient
(standard
error)
-0.0211
(0.0097)
-5.88e-06
(7.01e-06)
-0.0553
(0.3045)
-174.686
(514.752)
0.0667
(0.0320)
-8.08e-07
(2.51e-07)

p-value

0.030
0.402
0.856
0.734
0.038
0.001

Figure 1: Predicted Effect of Median Income on Property Crime
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Table 3: Property Crime & Poverty Model Comparison
Model

adjusted
r-squared

Variable

linear

0.9122

poverty rate

log-linear

0.7955

poverty rate

log-log

0.7955

ln(poverty rate)

linear-log

0.9122

ln(poverty rate)

quadratic

0.9123

poverty rate
poverty rate
squared

coefficient
(standard
error)
-7.272
(17.0316)
0.00343
(0.00804)
0.0786
(0.0857)
5.671
(156.199)
42.302
(31.896)
-1.656
(1.0642)

p-value

0.669
0.670
0.359
0.971
0.185
0.119

Figure 2: Predicted Effect of Poverty Rate on Property Crime
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Table 4: Property Crime Quadratic Model
Variable
Median income
Median income
squared
% Black
% Asian
% Hispanic
% Female
% between ages
15 and 29
% between ages
30 and 49
% between over
age 50
2001 dummy
2002 dummy
2003 dummy
2004 dummy
constant

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
0.0667
(0.0320)
-8.08e-07
(2.51e-07)
-18.523
(27.332)
-61.757
(43.736)
38.674
(34.673)
322.624
(84.270)
65.642
(32.316)
91.320
(64.787)
30.543
(40.053)
92.249
(20.444)
108.816
(33.325)
68.087
(47.568)
111.655
(69.281)
-19,257
(6,052)

p-value

Variable

0.038

Poverty rate

0.001
0.498

Poverty rate
squared
% Black

0.158

% Asian

0.408

% Hispanic

<0.001

% Female

0.042

<0.001

% between ages
15 and 29
% between ages
30 and 49
% between over
age 50
2001 dummy

0.001

2002 dummy

0.152

2003 dummy

0.107

2004 dummy

0.001

constant

0.159
0.446

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
42.302
(31.896)
-1.659
(1.064)
-25.463
(27.932)
-116.374
(41.621)
22.706
(35.935)
291.432
(85.363)
32.479
(32.004)
67.811
(65.172)
-1.357
(40.240)
100.643
(26.542)
125.029
(34.570)
94.141
(47.207)
142.395
(60.447)
-14,153
6,219

p-value
0.185
0.119
0.362
0.005
0.528
0.001
0.310
0.298
0.973
<0.001
<0.001
0.046
0.019
0.023
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Table 5: Violent Crime & Median Income Model Comparison
Model

adjusted
r-squared

Variable

linear

0.9389

median income

log-linear

0.8888

median income

log-log

0.8888

linear-log

0.9389

quadratic

0.9389

ln(median
income)
ln(median
income)
median income
median income
squared

coefficient
(standard
error)
0.000324
(0.00145)
-3.02e-06
(6.41e-06)
-0.1146
(0.2966)
38.749
(81.248)
0.00553
(0.00508)
-4.80e-08
(3.95e-08)

p-value

0.828
0.637
0.699
0.633
0.277
0.225

Figure 3: Predicted Effect of Median Income on Violent Crime
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Table 6: Violent Crime & Poverty Model Comparison
Model

adjusted
r-squared

Variable

linear

0.9389

poverty rate

log-linear

0.8888

poverty rate

log-log

0.8889

ln(poverty rate)

linear-log

0.9389

ln(poverty rate)

quadratic

0.9392

poverty rate
poverty rate
squared

coefficient
(standard
error)
-2.196
(2.395)
0.000944
(0.00873)
0.1637
(0.0929)
26.391
(22.731)
15.267
(5.974)
-0.583
(0.209)

p-value

0.359
0.914
0.078
0.246
0.011
0.005

Figure 4: Predicted Effect of Poverty Rate on Violent Crime
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Table 7: Violent Crime Quadratic Model
Variable
Median income
Median income
squared
% Black
% Asian
% Hispanic
% Female
% between ages
15 and 29
% between ages
30 and 49
% between over
age 50
2001 dummy
2002 dummy
2003 dummy
2004 dummy
constant

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
0.00553
(0.00508)
-4.80e-08
(3.95e-08)
3.668
(3.378)
-14.491
(6.028)
1.373
(3.903)
33.411
(9.673)
2.927
(4.968)
-4.797
(9.789)
2.952
(6.120)
5.611
(4.136)
1.179
(5.144)
-18.493
(7.312)
-16.113
(10.415)
-1,481
(798)

p-value

Variable

0.277

Poverty rate

0.225
0.278

Poverty rate
squared
% Black

0.016

% Asian

0.725

% Hispanic

0.001

% Female

0.556

0.175

% between ages
15 and 29
% between ages
30 and 49
% between over
age 50
2001 dummy

0.819

2002 dummy

0.011

2003 dummy

0.122

2004 dummy

0.063

constant

0.624
0.630

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
15.267
(5.974)
-0.583
(0.209)
2.625
(3.405)
-20.161
(5.671)
0.210
(3.923)
32.750
(9.814)
32.479
(32.004)
67.811
(65.172)
-1.357
(40.240)
5.788
(4.111)
2.547
(5.168)
-16.028
(7.022)
-10.537
(9.106)
-1,136
(789)

p-value
0.011
0.005
0.441
<0.001
0.957
0.001
0.310
0.298
0.973
0.159
0.622
0.023
0.247
0.150
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